Use of Games for Nurturing Upstream-Downstream Cooperation by CGIAR Challenge Program on Water and Food
Use of Games for Nurturing 
Upstream-Downstream Cooperation 
Payment for environmental services (PES) schemes are often designed with the twin objectives of nature conservation and 
added economic benefits to upland farmers 
whose activities have direct impact on the 
downstream population. The design of PES options 
is facilitated by simulation models such as SWAT 
and ECOSAUT. These tools help determine the 
best scenarios and areas with highest potential 
to deliver environmental services. However, the 
SWAT is a hydrologic modeling tool that is 
used for different land use scenarios vis-a-vis 
the hydrological features of the watershed.
ECOSAUT is a model used for valuation. 
it provides a socio-economic and 
environmental assessment of the land-use 
scenarios and alternatives.
Games for the analysis of 
collective use of natural 
resources
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be communicated to all stakeholder groups in a 
manner that is easily understood and appreciated  
and is non-threatening. Before finalizing any PES 
scheme, the communication strategy should ensure 
that the perspectives of both “environmental 
service providers” and those who will pay for 
the services are considered and secured their 
cooperation secured. In view of this, the CGIAR 
Challenge Program on Water and Food (CPWF) 
Environmental Services and Rural Development 
Project used economic games for exploring the 
willingness of service providers and beneficiaries to 
cooperate in developing and implementing socially 
acceptable PES schemes.
Let the games begin
Results from  SWAT and ECOSAUT simulation 
models are used as inputs into the decision-
making games. The decision-making games 
evaluate stakeholders’ willingness to collaborate 
and negotiate amongst themselves and resolve 
areas identified may not be where the poorest 
live. Moreover, rich farmers in both upstream 
and downstream areas, as well as other sectors 
downstream, may not agree to meet the added 
costs of PES. They may not see the value of 
investing in nature conservation without additional 
and direct returns. It is therefore important to 
effectively communicate to them how their support 
to upstream interventions will, in the long run, 
benefit them as well.
Communicating 
and getting people 
to work on the 
scenarios
Computer-generated models may be technically-
sound, but they will only contribute to the 
success of the PES schemes if people accept the 
recommendations. Different scenarios need to 
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Figure 1.  A Framework for Use of Economic Games in Refining PES Schemes
Land use/management scenarios + PES 
options from SWAT and ECOSAUT results
Design and planning of 
decision-making games
General conflicts to resolve
  For upstream service providers: 
Whether to adopt proposed land 
use and management changes
  For downstream recipients of 
service: Whether to pay for the 
environmental service
Decision-making scenarios
  Without communication with 
other stakeholders (current 
situation)
  With communication
  With low sanctions
Workshop using games to 
generate data/feedback for 
further development of PES 
scheme
Analysis of decisions made in 
the games by stakeholders
Inputs into further development of PES 
scheme
Tools
Economic games:
  Competitive 
marketing with and 
without externalities
  Public good 
provision game
  Common pool 
resource game
  Watershed game
  Prisoners’ game
  Trust game
  Negotiating/
bargaining game
Participatory rural 
appraisal (PRA)
Objective
To get feedback on
  Acceptability of 
scenarios/options
  Willingness of 
different stakeholder 
groups to cooperate, 
negotiate and 
resolve conflicts
Inputs from the Games
  Land use scenarios, 
payment schemes 
and negotiations 
suggested 
  Cost figures or values 
inherent to proposed 
changes introduced 
in to the game
Participants
  Representatives from 
different stakeholder 
groups (upstream 
and downstream) 
  Games conducted in 
consecutive rounds 
under the three 
decision-making 
scenarios and the 
different conflict 
situations
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cooperation-related conflicts and to establish 
to what extent reciprocity, trust, inequality and 
risk aversion can influence decisions in resolving 
environmental dilemmas (Cardenas and Ramos 
2006). For details on the design and application of 
the games, see Estrada et al. (2009) and Lopez et al. 
n.d.).
Experiences and 
findings in the use of 
economic games in 
the Andes
1. When people understand the relationship 
between land use and hydological externalities 
such as quantity and quality of water flows, 
local agreements (as self-control mechanisms 
for implementing appropriate land uses) are 
easily reached.
2. Communities prefer to work with local 
organizations in managing economic 
resources because of the poor reputation of 
their local governments.
3. Farmers value employment generation for 
the landless and provision of materials for 
land use management more than monetary 
payments.
4. In one instance, economic games facilitated 
the creation of an inter-sectoral committee for 
promoting the establishment of a fund to pay 
for ecosystem services.
5. Involving the downstream wealthy farmers 
in the economic games was difficult. They 
own lands with good water allocation and 
therefore do not want to pay extra without 
potential conflicts. The combined use of economic 
games and participatory rural appraisal (PRA) tools 
in simulation exercises of real-life problems (in a 
safe environment) is an innovative way to collect 
information about people’s economic behavior 
when facing social or cooperation dilemmas (Lopez 
et al. n.d.).
The decision-making games are played 
by representatives from the upstream and 
downstream communities in the watershed area. 
Upstream players make the choice whether or 
not to change their current land-use scenarios 
or management practices; downstream players 
can provide payment to upsteam players as an 
incentive for changes to land-use/management 
practices. Their decisions are examined under 
different scenarios: 
  a scenario without communication between 
players/actors (which serves as baseline)
  a scenario of negotiation where the different 
players are allowed to discuss before making a 
decision
  a scenario where decisions are enforced by the 
application of penalties to players (who do not 
shift to better management practices or do not 
pay the service providers)
The results of the games allow one to analyze 
of the possibilities and limitations in resolving 
The economic games provide answers to 
these questions:
  Which stakeholder groups will continue 
with the same land management practices? 
  Which will change their management 
practices? 
  Which groups are willing to pay or 
compensate those making beneficial 
changes in their systems? 
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5. PES payments should not target individual 
farmers as service providers, but groups or 
communities to reduce transaction costs.  This 
also ensures that the required threshold to 
achieve the desired impact from the service is 
met.
Recommendations 
for future economic 
games
 
Economic games have proven useful in 
understanding the conditions under which 
compensation for environmental services may be 
feasible. 
This project has highlighted the fact that there 
is room for refinements in the games in order to 
ensure the participation of the wealthiest farmers  
in the games. 
It is also useful to check on other stakeholders 
whose representation may have not been made 
explicit—e.g., women and children. 
Adding reality to the games by using actual or 
factual figures instead of symbolic numbers can 
help to more accurately determine how willingness 
to pay for environmental services varies among 
different stakeholders.
additional benefits to them. On the contrary, 
downstream small farmers participated in 
the economic games and showed willingness 
to compensate upstream farmers for their 
environmental services.
Lessons from the 
games
The conduct of economic games offered very 
valuable insights and helped to recognize that 
1. Willingness to cooperate is dependent on good 
communication between the parties. However, 
an investment is required to initiate and 
facilitate the dialogue process.
2. Command-and-control mechanisms such as 
laws and regulations may be  the only way to 
make the wealthy downstream farmers adhere 
to PES schemes.
3. Identification of win-win technological 
alternatives to improve the environmental 
and economic performance of conventional 
agricultural systems is essential. This may 
accelerate the negotiation process by 
incorporating new incentives for farmers 
beyond mere payments for environmental 
services. 
4. PES should consider non-monetary payments 
such as construction of schools and health 
centers and livelihood-training activities. These 
kinds of payment can have long-term benefits 
for the communities. The disadvantage is 
that the community members who are not 
benefiting from these non-monetary payments 
would not have the incentive to deliver a 
service. 
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